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Abstract: While Qatari unemployment is low compared to regional standards, unemployment is 
even more concentrated among first time job-seeking youth than in other countries in the Arab 
world. This paper examines the factors that influence unemployment by young Qataris when 
they are first entering the labor market. This paper first introduces the set of labor market 
policies that govern the employment of Qatari nationals. Next, the paper examines the labor 
market outcomes of Qatari youth from 1995 to 2014 to evaluate the effect of these policies.  
Finally, the paper uses a unique data set of 2,000 primarily young Qataris to model 
unemployment duration. These data were collected in September and October of 2014 and 
explore typical labor market indicators as well as questions concerning the school to work 
transition. Using non-parametric models of unemployment duration, this paper describes the 
different characteristics that are correlated with longer spells of unemployment duration by first 
time job seekers. The paper finds that own education and gender are the two most important 
factors determining the length of unemployment spells for young Qataris.  
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1. Introduction 
The transition from schooling to work is one of the most difficult periods in the transition 
from youth to adulthood. In the Middle East, this transition has been particularly fraught as labor 
market structure and the recent youth bulge has caused a large number of young people, often 
with advanced degrees to be seeking a relatively small number of jobs. This phenomenon is 
manifested in youth unemployment rates that are the highest in the work. Furthermore because of 
the relatively strong employment protection offered to workers with jobs, youth unemployment 
is often 3 to 4 times that of adult unemployment rates. While the Gulf region, and especially 
Qatar has lower unemployment rates, unemployment is primarily a youth phenomenon. This 
paper examines the factors that influence unemployment by young Qataris when they are first 
entering the labor market.  
In order to fully understand this phenomenon, one must place the Qatari experience in its 
appropriate policy context. As a labor receiving country, the policy challenge has involved 
encouraging young people to get the right types of skills and encouraging private sector 
employers to hire them. The policy challenge remains substantial because while governments 
can easily prohibit forms of economic activity, it is much more difficult to encourage economic 
activity in a given area. Encouraging Qatarization requires that Qataris be willing to work in the 
private sector and that private sector manages be willing to hire Qataris under current labor 
market conditions. There are both economic and institutional factors that create hurdles in 
encouraging private sector employment. Qatarization policies have yet to be able to overcome 
these institutional hurdles while some recent policies have actually made Qatarization of the 
private sector more difficult.   
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 One hurdle arises due to Qatar’s rapid economic growth in the past 15-20 years. With the 
economic boom has come a demand for low skilled (expatriate) labor while at the same time, 
many Qataris have been able to afford not to work.  This is particularly true in the case of Qatari 
men over the age of 40 who can begin to retire from public sector jobs and often have alternate 
sources of income to supplement their pensions. The second hurdle is that policies to support 
Qatari workers in the public sector have actually worked to impede Qatarization in the private 
sector.  This has been largely due to the more attractive work conditions and prestige associated 
with the public sector compared to the private sector. After the fall 2011 Emiri decree of 
increasing public sector salaries by 60 percent (120 percent for the military), private sector 
businesses will find it even more difficult to attract and retain Qataris. Thus, while the Qatari 
government is attempting to localize its workforce, other policy objectives may impede the 
success of Qatarization.  
The foundation for understanding the current policy environment in Qatar is the Qatar 
National Vision 2030 (QNV). This vision influences all aspects of policy currently being 
considered in Qatar. The QNV seeks to transform a rapidly growing hydrocarbon-based 
economy that is dependent upon less skilled expatriate labor into an economy that seeks most of 
its growth through knowledge intensive sectors. This concept of a K-economy for Qatar is based 
upon a vision of sustainable growth beyond hydrocarbons. The QNV sets forth three interrelated 
goals for the Qatari economy (1) a high standard of living; (2) expanded innovation and 
entrepreneurship; and (3) economic outcomes being aligned with economic and financial 
security. As part of this effort, the overriding emphasis is to create a diversified K-economy such 
that it is not completely beholden to the whims of the international hydrocarbon market. In order 
to implement the QNV, the National Development Strategy 2011-2016 sets out more specific 
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action items in order to build towards the QNV goals. The NDS attempts to align expatriate labor 
demand with the QNV by attempting to match the size and quality of the expatriate labor force 
with the path to development.  Specifically, the NDS hopes to move away from low skilled labor 
and towards high skilled labor while skill upgrading continues for the Qatari labor force, with a 
target Qatarization rate of 15 percent in the private sector. However, with only 16% of Qatar’s  
entire labor force being comprised of Qatari nationals, the challenge of meeting this target will 
be daunting.   
The recent growth of the expatriate population within Qatar has been phenomenal.  The 
total population of Qatar grew from 490,000 in 1990 (Willoughby, 2004) to 1.7 million in 2010 
(QSA, 2010). This population growth primarily happened since 1997 and was largely due to the 
growth in the expatriate workforce. The expatriate population more than doubled from 2004 to 
2010. This growth in the expatriate population was necessary to fuel the economic growth that 
took place, especially due to the booming liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector.  
This paper will use a unique data set collected in September and October of 2014 and 
explore typical labor market indicators as well as questions concerning the school to work 
transition. Using parametric and non-parametric models of unemployment duration, this paper 
describes the different characteristics that are correlated with longer spells of unemployment 
duration by first time job seekers. The paper finds that own education and parental education are 
the two most important factors influencing the school to work transition for young Qataris.  
2.  Qatari Labor Market conditions 
Qatar’s population increased dramatically in the past twenty years. The number of Qatari 
nationals increased from 1990 to 2010 from 116 thousand to over 230 thousand, roughly 
doubling. The overall population increased even more dramatically as the population of 
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expatriates increased from 305 thousand in 1990 to over 1.4 million in 2010. This was largely as 
a response to the aggressive development strategies pursued since 1995 and the need for non-
Qatari labor, especially in the construction sector. As of 2013 the population stood at nearly 2.2 
million with less than one seventh of that population native Qatar (Snoj, 2013).   
Given these relative numbers it is clearly not possible to exclusively use a domestic labor 
force to fill all of these jobs. When individuals discuss Qatarization, even of the private labor 
force, they generally do not tend to imply that they expect all of the basic occupations in 
construction, domestic service and services to have a certain proportion Qatari. Instead, the 
implication is Qatarization of only a certain section of jobs. However, even given this narrower 
definition of Qatarization, an examination of other labor market characteristics will shows that 
there are weaknesses of the Qatari labor force and areas that could be improved regarding 
staffing of private sector and government sector jobs with more Qatari nationals.  
By examining the policy settings of Qatar, it will now be possible to interpret the current 
labor market conditions and finally analyze the impact that Qatarization policies have on 
employment of youth. The first basic labor market statistic to understand is the labor force 
participation rate. This rate is defined as the proportion or percentage of the total working age 
population which is either currently employed or not employed, but looking for work 
(unemployment). Those not in the labor force include retirees, the disabled, students and those 
who are fully dedicated to household duties.   
The primary observations of the labor force participation rate can be summed up as 
follows. Labor force participation rate among Qatari men is low compared to both developed and 
developing countries. The labor force participation rate for women is low compared to most 
developed countries, but it is increasing especially compared to fellow GCC countries.  In the 
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second quarter of 2014, the labor force participation rate for Qatari men over the age of 15 was 
68%; while the rate for women was 36%. In general, there has been an upward trend in labor 
force participation for men, as fewer are continuing on with their studies, while women’s labor 
force participation has remained roughly the same, around 35% (see Figure 1).   
The labor force participation rate for women shows a substantial increase in the past 20 
years.  This is particularly apparent among women aged 20 to 24 in recent years (see Figure 2). 
Figure 3 shows labor force participation of Qatari men, by year and age group. As seen in this 
figure, the recent rise in labor force participation has come from several age groups, but the most 
dramatic increase was for the group aged 20-24. If these young men were not in the labor force, 
then they would like be schooling so the increase in the labor force participation of young men is 
actually a negative sign of the movement away from continued schooling (this will be discussed 
further below). For women, older, post-schooling age groups have been increasing their 
participation in the last couple of years while school aged women have had their labor force 
participation or dropping somewhat from 2012 to 2013 (see Figure 4).   
Unemployment is fairly low, as one would expect in such a rapidly developing economy, 
but it differs significantly by age, gender and educational level.  For men, the highest 
unemployment rates are for those young men with only secondary schooling or below. For 
women, the highest unemployment rate is for those women with university level schooling.  
Unemployment is a market failure in that the available positions in the economy are not well 
matched with the workers who are willing to take on work, or there is lack of information about 
the availability of workers or jobs. However, it is clear that when it comes to matching workers 
with jobs, the primary consideration is one of social norms, benefits and expectations.  
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The overall female unemployment rate (3.3 percent) is over four times the male 
unemployment rate (0.7 percent). These figures can seem even more dramatic depending on the 
age group and year (see Table 1). In the most recent years, unemployment for young women has 
been as high as 10 times higher than unemployment for male youth.  In 2013,  the 20-24 year old 
age group, women have a 12.7 percent unemployment rate compared to only a 1.2 percent for 
men.  By the time these young people reach the 25-29 year old age group, the men’s 
unemployment rate drops to a negligible 1.2 percent, and for women the unemployment rate 
stays drops to2.5 percent. However, in recent years, when the labor market wasn’t quite so 
strong, women’s unemployment rate would stay above 10 percent until women were in their 30s.  
The effect of education on unemployment also differs between men and women. For 
men, with the exception of illiterate Qatari’s, the higher level of education, the lower the 
unemployment rate.  For women, there unemployment is highest for those with the lowest level 
of schooling (for the purpose of 2013 data, this would be primary level), and then decreases with 
education level. Women with only primary schooling have a 23 percent unemployment rate, 
those with a preparatory have a 14 percent unemployment rate, but those with university or more 
schooling have an unemployment rate under 1 percent.   For men, unemployment follows a 
similar pattern with those at the secondary level having a slightly higher unemployment rate than 
those at the preparatory level (.8 percent compared to .7 percent), but the highest unemployment 
is with primary level (2.5 percent) and the lowest is with university or above .3 percent.  
One of the telling aspects of the issue of unemployment involves the fact that many of the 
unemployed are waiting for jobs in the public sector. In the 2008 labor force survey one half of 
all unemployed Qataris responded that they were not willing to work in the private sector. For 
women the proportion not willing to work in the private sector is 64 percent with only 36 percent 
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willing to work.  For men the proportion is reversed with 65 percent of the unemployed men 
willing to work in the private sector while only 35% are not willing to work in the private sector.  
(QSA, 2009) 
By 2013 these figures had changed, with women and men showing less of an inclination 
to work in the private sector.  Among unemployed women in the 2013 survey, 75 percent said 
they are unwilling to work in the private sector and 25 percent were willing to work in the 
private sector.  An even bigger decrease occurred for unemployed men. While 65 percent had 
said they were willing to take a private sector job in 2008, this had fallen to 39 percent by 2013. 
Thus, men and women were generally unwilling to work in the private sector by 2013. While 
there are many possible reasons for this change, one of them could have been the 2011 pay 
increase for public sector workers. In fact, the number one reason why men said they would not 
work in the private sector was because of the lower wages in the private sector. For women, it 
was also the low pay the discouraged them from seeking private sector work, but the hours of 
work also was highly ranked.  
Due to the requirement that non-Qataris be sponsored by employers to be able to reside in 
the country, it is not surprising that non Qataris have much lower unemployment rates than 
Qataris. Non Qatari men have unemployment rates less than .1% compared to .7% for Qatari 
men and non-Qatari women have and unemployment rate of 1.2% percent compared to 3.4% for 
Qatari women, in 2013.  
Unemployment for Qataris is primarily a problem for first time job seekers. In 2013, only 
9.8 percent of unemployed Qatari men and none (literally 0 individuals in the sample) of 
unemployed women have been employed previously. Thus, Qatari unemployment is primarily a 
concern of young female job seekers with less than a college education, though other 
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demographic groups still exhibit significant numbers of unemployed. Finally, it should be noted 
that although the overall unemployment rates are much higher for women, the total number of 
unemployed are not as dramatically different, due to differences in participation rates. For the 
2013 survey, the estimate is only 1,029 Qatari women were unemployed and 400 Qatari men 
were unemployed.  
 
3. Has Qatarization been successful?  
 
 
While there are no clear guidelines as to what will ultimately define successful 
Qatarization efforts, an analysis of the extant data will allow us to get a better understanding as 
to how much progress has been made. In order to understand where these Qatarization efforts 
stand, this paper will examine the distribution of employment by industry and nationality, the 
changes over time in the distribution by sector and the degree to which Qataris are engaging in 
both employment and schooling.  
 
The distribution of employment by industry, gender and nationality is seen in Table 2. 
While the public administration workforce is comprised of more than 50 percent Qatari 
nationals, most other major industries have less than 10 percent of their total workforce made up 
of Qatari nationals.  For example, construction, which employs more than half a million workers, 
has less than one fourth of one percent of its workface made up of native Qataris. Education is 
another field that employs a large share of Qatari nationals. Thirty percent of total education 
employment are Qatari nationals and 84 percent of these Qataris are women.   
Table 2 shows that the percentage of those employed who are Qatari definitely differs 
based upon gender. For men, 48 percent of the 80,000 men who work in public administration 
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and defense are Qatari. For women the number is even more striking as 71 percent of the women 
who work in this sector are Qatari. Another sector where there is a strong difference between 
men and women is education. While only 13 percent of the 13,000 men who work in education 
are Qatari, Qatari women comprise a total of 36 percent of the 26,000 women in this sector. 
Other fields that are predominantly Qatari include mining and quarrying where 9 percent of the 
men are Qatari and 32 percent of the women are Qatari. Both health and information technology 
sectors are ones that should be expected to grow given the QNV 2030 and given the proportion 
of Qatari employment, this is a promising development. In the health sector 11 percent of the 
13,000 men who work in this sector are Qatari and 24 percent of the 14,000 women who work in 
this sector are Qatari.  Of the women engaged in professional and scientific activities, 11  are 
Qatari, while of the men only one percent are Qatari, which may reflect the relative increase in 
the greater numbers of Qatari women pursuing advanced degrees compared to men.  
There are two things that must take place for the proportion of Qataris in private and 
mixed sectors to increase. First, more Qataris must enter the work force and stay in it longer to 
meet the market demand for these workers.  Second, incentives must be such that the private and 
mixed sectors will hire more Qataris and more Qataris must be willing to their supply of labor to 
these sectors.  
One statistic that will help assess the degree to which Qataris are more engaged in the 
labor force is the labor force participation rate. However, it is also useful to note that in addition 
to encouraging more Qataris to work, there has also been educational reform which has 
encouraged them to stay in school for longer and to obtain tertiary education. One of the effects 
of encouraging students to stay in school is that there will be lower labor force participation rates 
for especially those aged 20-24 as they are not leaving school after the secondary level to pursue 
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work. Thus, there are two statistics that I will refer to below. The first is labor force participation 
rate of those aged 25 to 39, who are less likely to be affected by efforts to increase the level of 
schooling. The second is the proportion of the population that is engaged in either schooling or 
work. This is the work+schooling rate is 84.5% for men and 58.1% for women in 2009.  In 2007, 
the work+school rate was 85.0% for men and 55.5% for women. Women increased the 
proportion that they were both in the workforce and in schooling during these two years. 
Looking back a bit earlier, they work+schooling rate in 2001 for men was 81% while the 
work+schooling rate for Qatari women was 50%. Thus, there has been an eight percentage point 
increase in this more broadly defined version of economic activity for women.  Since 2009, the 
rate has remained flat. In second quarter of 2014, the work+schooling rate for women was up to 
58% and for men it stood at 86%.  
The source for the change for women has been entirely due to the increase in the 
employment to population rate for women. In 2001, employment rate for women was only 21.4 
percent. This figure grew to 32.6 percent in 2005 and 34.7 percent in 2009 and stayed nearly 
steady at 33.9 in 2014. From 2005 to 2009, the proportion of women going to school decreased 
during this time, but the overall growth in employment made up for this. Thus, the decline in 
schooling is not because women are not achieving the same level of education as education rates 
are increasing. Instead, there are relatively smaller cohorts of women in school at any time 
(compared to those who have finished schooling), while the absolute numbers continue to grow.  
Based upon the 20 percent goal in all sectors (government, government company, mixed 
and private) Qatarization targets were met early on in the public sector. In 1997, the quantitative 
target was to reach 20 percent in 4 years. Most, if not all, public sector authorities met this target.  
In 1999, for example, figures and statistics show that Qatarization in the public administration 
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was 60 percent, in government corporations it was 27 percent, and in the mixed sector it was 18 
percent.  Thus, Qatarization in most organizations was actually above the stated target. However, 
more recent data show that since the economic boom during the 2000s, there has such rapid 
expansion of the Qatari economy and the labor force that the percentage Qatari in each sector has 
dropped since 1999. Figure 5 shows the relative distribution of Labor Force between Qataris and 
Non-Qataris by sector in 2013 (QSA, 2014).  As seen in this figure, Qataris now make up less 
than 50 percent of the government sector workers. In government companies the percentage is 
less than 20 percent and in the private sector, the Qatari share of employment is less than only .1 
percent. Finally, Oil and Gas Sector (OGS) also promoted a separate Qatarization policy that has 
been met with some success. While the overall goal has had to be revised downward, this sector 
has increased the overall Qatari share since the 1980s from 30 percent to 50 percent today.  
While the overall percentage of Qataris in any sector is going to be negatively affected by 
the dramatic expansion of the economic in the past 10 years, there can be some indication of the 
success of Qatarization based upon the sector of employment. If Qataris are becoming less 
dependent upon the public sector, either public administration or public companies, then some of 
the goals of Qatarization can be seen as being met.  Figures 6 and 7 show the percentage of 
Qataris in employment by sector for men (Figure 6) and women (Figure 7) from 2006 to 2013. 
As seen in Figure 6, there has been a decline in the share of Qatari employment for men in 
government companies and a rise in the share in the private sector. In government companies 
while 16 percent of Qatari men worked in this sector in 2006, the figure has fallen to 13 percent 
in the more recent data. In the private sector, while only 6 percent of Qatari men worked in this 
sector in 2006, this figure has now increased to nearly double at 11 percent. While the change in 
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distribution is important, it is also worthwhile to note that this represents nearly a trebling of the 
total number of Qatari men in the private sector from 2400 to 6500.   
Table 5 shows the economic status by age from the 2010 Qatari Census for all employed 
Qataris (men and women).  It is clear from looking at these figures that the proportion of the 
workforce that are either on their own account or are employers is very low in the Qatari 
economy. This is not a surprise given the relatively few individuals that are employed in the 
private sector, where most of the employers will be located. In 2010 fewer than 2 percent of 
employed youth were either on their own or employed others. The highest rate of 
entrepreneurship was actually among 15-19 year olds of whom 2.3 percent were employers or on 
their own account. These rates stay very low until Qataris reach their 40s. It is likely when they 
retire from public sector jobs in their 40s, many Qataris then decide to begin a second career as 
an employer.  
 
4. Qatarization efforts, youth and families 
The efforts to increase the proportion Qataris working in the Qatari economy can only 
come about through a combination of some or all of the following factors. First, the overall 
demand for labor, especially unskilled labor, will need to decrease. Given the relative size of the 
Qatari population, an increase in unskilled labor demand will continue to create strong demand 
for expatriate labor.  
Second, there will need to be an increase in labor force participation for Qataris in their 
40s and 50s. As there is an increase in health outcomes and educational levels, the movement to 
a K-economy should promote the ability of Qatari men to stay in the workforce later, instead of 
labor force participation decreasing around the age of 40. 
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Third, there will need to be an increase in labor force participation of Qatari women. 
Right now, the labor force participation rate of Qatari women at 36 percent reflects important 
growth in this aspect of Qatarization. However, compared to the most highly developed 
countries, this participation rate still lags behind the natural peers that Qatar should aspire to 
compare itself with. Furthermore, since employment of Qatari women is largely found in the 
education and public administration sectors and there is a relatively large unemployment rate for 
women who cannot find jobs in these sectors, there appears to be an imbalance in the matching 
job seekers and job opportunities. The essence of this problem lies in the social norms that attract 
women primarily to government sector jobs and the relatively unattractive nature of private 
sector jobs. Of unemployed women surveyed less than half said that they would be interested in 
a private sector job.  
Fourth, there needs to be an overall increase in Qatari population. The Qatari government 
has explicitly begun a pro-natalist policy in order to effect this increase in Qatari population, thus 
leading to needing fewer expatriate workers in the future due to a relatively largely domestic 
population. However, this effort to increase population growth rates will negatively impact 
Qatari women’s ability to participate in the labor force and thus works against another factor to 
increase Qatarization. 
5. Unemployment Duration during the school to work transition 
Data 
Data for the following section comes from the 2014 Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) 
data for Qatar. The GEM was started as a joint venture with the London Business School and 
Babson College in 1999 and now covers countries entailing 75% of the world’s population and 
90% of the world’s GDP. Silatech is the local partner for 2014 GEM Qatar. The current data 
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come from a module within GEM Qatar that was created to study the school to work transition 
for young Qatari’s through a partnership between Silatech and FIKRA Research & Policy. The 
survey was conducted August-October 2014 and released to partner organizations in December 
2014.  
This data set contains 2,025 Qataris and 2,235 non-Qataris. This analysis will focus on 
the Qatari sample which is relatively well educated: 17% have less than secondary schooling; 
40% have secondary and 34% have tertiary schooling. The bulk of the survey is between 18 and 
34 years old. 23 % are 18-24 years old; 30% are 25-34 while 40% are between 35 and 54. The 
sample is slightly more female than male, representing the greater likelihood for Qatari males to 
be abroad: 52 % are female and 48% are male. 
Figure 8 shows unemployment duration through a Kaplan Meier survival function. The y 
axis shows the proportion of the population that has “survived” in the base state, which in this 
case is to be unemployed (seeking work). The x axis is the months that the individual has been 
seeking work without finding a job. Figure 8 shows that non-Qataris are more likely to exit 
unemployment after finishing schooling than are Qataris. It takes approximately 4 months longer 
for three quarters of Qataris to find a job compared to non-Qataris. The rest of the figures will 
only examine the Qatari portion of sample and will look at various subgroups. 
Figure 9 shows unemployment duration by sex. Male exit unemployment more rapidly 
than women, but this mostly shows up in the amount of time it takes the very slowest job finders 
take. For example, approximately 50 percent of both men and women find work within 4-5 
months. However for men 75% percent of them have found a job within 6 months,  but it takes 6 
months longer for 75 percent of women to find work (a full 12 months). 
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By age (Figure 10) and education (Figure 11), a few clear patterns emerge. First, note that 
while Figure 10 shows the findings by age group, since this is retrospective data about their 
transition from schooling to work, the transition for older workers took place many years before 
the transition for younger workers. The very youngest workers in the sample (18-24) and 
workers over 45 have the shortest unemployment durations. This may reflect the relatively small 
size of the employment cohort for older workers by which the public sector easily absorbed 
workers going back 20 years or more and that fewer women participated in the labor force in 
previous years. The youngest workers having short duration might be a selection issue by which 
only those who do not going on to tertiary schooling (because they have access to a job already) 
are in this pool.  
Figure 11 shows the impact of education independently on unemployment duration. The 
four education groups shown in this figure are less than secondary; secondary; diploma (or 13-15 
years) and university. In the figure that includes both men and women (Figure 11), we see that 
less than secondary and secondary have longer spells of unemployment after finishing schooling 
than do those Qataris that earn either a diploma or a university degree. Getting a university 
degree only tends to cut unemployment duration slightly when looking at this pooled data. Even 
more of an issue, those that complete a secondary degree have longer durations on the right hand 
tail (last 25% to find a job) than those who have less than secondary degree. Since most young 
people nowadays have at least a secondary degree, this may represent some pooling over 
generations. 
Figures 12 and 13 attempt to examine the independent impact of education separately for 
men and women. Figure 12 shows that for men each level of education decreases the duration of 
unemployment, though often the differences are minor. For men with both tertiary forms of 
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schooling (diploma and university) about 75% of young people find jobs within 6 months. It 
takes an additional 3 months for 75% of those with secondary degrees to find a job and another 
month longer for 75% of those with less than a secondary to find work. For women, the story is 
more diverse. While 75% of women with a university degree find work within 6 months, it takes 
nearly a year for 75% of those with only a diploma to find work. For those with only a secondary 
degree, it takes nearly two years for them to find a job after finishing schooling. Thus, for 
women there is a real return to going to university since tertiary education leads to significantly 
shorter unemployment duration.  
  
 
6. Conclusions 
The policy problem created by the large expatriate population in Qatar today is 
multifaceted. It is impossible to continue to develop at the rate that they have been without 
continued reliance on workers from abroad. However, with a redirection of the economy away 
from such a heavy dependence on the hydrocarbon sector and towards a knowledge-based 
economy, there is the possibility of effective Qatarization. 
Unfortunately, most of the success of Qatarization has taken place within the government 
sector. This is largely due to the increase in employment of Qatari women and the increased 
educational levels of all Qataris leading to the greater use of high skilled domestic labor instead 
of foreign labor. However, the stigma against working in the private sector remains and the only 
serious attempts increase the demand for Qatari labor in the private sector and increase the 
supply of labor to that sector will take the place of making both Qatari and non-Qatari labor 
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more expensive. Non-Qatari labor needs to become more expensive (it is argued) because the 
low wages that can be offered leads to expansion in sectors that are low skilled intensive. 
On the other hand, it is argued that private sector jobs should become more expensive to 
employers is justified due the need to make these jobs more attractive to Qataris by offering 
benefits and wages that are equivalent to those found in the public sector.  
However, what is keeping Qataris out of the private sector is as much a matter of social 
norms and cultural values as it is about riyals and benefits. For example the low labor force 
participation rate of Qatari women is one factor that increases the need for expatriate labor. If 
women worked as much as men, there would be 20,000 fewer expatriates needed in the 
workforce.  However, it is seen as by some in Qatar to be prestigious to have women not work 
outside the home (GSDP Labor, 2010).  Without the need for a second income due to the 
relatively high wages for Qatari men, the only thing that will push women into the workforce is 
social norms and cultural values that view working outside the home as something prestigious or 
aspirational. With role models such as Her Highness SHeikha Mozah Bint Nasser Al-Misnad, 
and countless women holding high level positions throughout the workforce, there is likely to be 
increased acceptance and willingness to work outside the home (Felder and Vuollo, 2008). 
However, employer attitudes towards women still need to be improved because certain positions 
are seen as not appropriate because women ask for too much time off for family reasons (Stasz, 
Eide, and Martorell, 2007).  
Likewise, Qatari men also show a strong preference to working in the public sector, even 
though it is not as strong of a preference as that shown by Qatari women.  There is relatively 
little labor force attachment for non-pecuniary reasons and as soon as Qatari men can afford to 
retire due to generous pension plans, end of service payments and non-labor income, they choose 
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to do so. Keeping these men in the workforce after they can afford to retire will take a change in 
social norms and culture as much as any economic incentives that may be offered.  
In terms of unemployment determination, men and women have very different 
experiences. While 50 percent of men find employment within 3 months, it takes 50% of women 
4 months to find a job. Also, while younger cohorts have slightly shorter spells than older 
cohorts, the pattern is not clear and could be tied to generational issues related to education and 
gender as much as other patterns. Finally, education has a different impact for men and women. 
While a university degree or diploma for men leads to 50% finding jobs in 3-4 months, it takes 
less than secondary 5 months for 50% to find a job. For university and diploma educated men 
75% find jobs within 6 months; it takes 9 months of secondary educated to reach this milestone. 
For women, there is a bigger return for the university degree. While 75% of women with a 
university degree have found a job within 6 months (same as men), for women with only a 
secondary degree it takes 24 months for 75% of them to end their unemployment spells.  
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Figure 8 . Unemployment duration by nationality 
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Figure 9. Unemployment duration by sex 
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Figure 10. Unemployment duration by age 
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Figure 11. Unemployment duration by education 
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Figure 12. Unemployment Duration Male by Education 
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Figure 13.  Unemployment Duration: Female by Education 
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Table 1. Unemployment rates by nationality, gender and year, 2007-
2013 (percent) 
 2007 2008 2009 2011 2012 2013 
Qatari male youth (15-24) 4.6 3.8 4.5 2.4 3.2 1.1 
Qatari female youth (15-24) 20.4 11.5 10.9 17.1 18.6 12.3 
       
Qatari male total (15+) 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.3 0.7 
Qatari female total (15+) 6 3.7 3.4 8 6.4 3.3 
       
Non-Qatari male total (15+) 0.13 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Non-Qatari female total (15+) 1.7 1.2 1.5 2.4 2.1 1.2 
 
 Qatari Non-Qatari 
 Males Females Total Males Females Total 
Construction 1026 288 1314 564312 3050 567362 
Wholesale and 
retail trade 
1144 343 1487 185834 6763 192597 
Manufacturing 1238 137 1375 117222 855 118077 
Public 
administration 
and defense;  
38215 10776 48991 42521 4260 46781 
Mining and 
quarrying 
7557 1054 8611 84620 2177 86797 
Administrative 
and support 
service activities 
333 643 976 43619 3341 46960 
Transportation 
and storage 
1384 238 1622 37287 6029 43316 
Education 1779 9347 11126 11644 16920 28564 
Accommodation 
and food service 
activities 
444 326 770 34769 3369 38138 
Professional, 
scientific and 
technical 
activities 
277 189 466 26495 1598 28093 
Human health 
and social work 
activities 
1419 3550 4969 11518 11356 22874 
 
